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The Child in the Silent Walk 
Donald De Marco 
This article was the basis of 
the keynote address delivered by 
Professor DeMarco at the 4th 
Annual Ecumenical Prayer 
Breakfast held in Chicago Oct. 
24, 1981. A columnist and 
feature writer for the Toronto 
Catholic Register and associate 
editor of Child and Family Quar-
terly, he is an associate professor 
of philosophy at the University 
of St. Jerome's College in Ontario. 
On Mother's Day, during the International Year of the Child, 1,300 
people walked in silence around the municipal hospital of Kitchener-
Waterloo (Ont.) in protest to the rising number of abortions being 
performed there. It was a style of protest paradigmatic for pro-lifers, 
for on that same day and for similar reasons, they were circumambu-
lating hospitals in other North American cities: modern Joshuas lead-
ing their bands around modern Jerichos, not to shake the ground so 
that the walls would come tumbling down, but to shake consciences 
so that protection for the unborn might start tightening up. But to 
onlookers, this spectacle must certainly have offered an ambiguous 
message: people giving witness to their concern for the unborn, or 
people making a spectacle of themselves. Event is one thing, but eval-
uation is another, and viewers can evaluate the same event in any num-
ber of contradictory ways. How, we might ask, does one evaluate a 
silent walk around an abortion-performing hospital? 
The journalist reporting for the local newspaper saw this pro-life 
procession as constituting a public nuisance rather than as marshalling 
a moral force. He therefore sought to discredit the walk, but in so 
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doing, was careful not to falsify any of the facts and thereby discredit 
himself. He began by centering on one of the 1,300 marchers, a boy 
about 10 years old, carrying a sign which read (or to use the journal-
ist's more rhetorical term, "screamed"): "We protest the killing of 
unborn babies." He enlarged upon this opening ploy by emphasizing 
that in addition to this young lad there were about 300 other children. 
To carry his discreditation a degree further, he noted the presence of 
one more dubious protester - a proud and perky canine. He awarded 
the more articulate members of the demonstration - the political 
leaders, the doctors, the clergymen, the teachers, and so on - less 
journalistic space and significance than the 300 children and a dog. 
The tactic proved at least partially successful, moving one reader to 
express her outrage in a letter to the editor: "How on earth can a boy 
of that age even start to understand what abortion is and means? I'd 
like to see the day when I can sit down and have an intelligent conver-
sation about abortion with a 10-year-old." 
"Children should be seen and not heard," we have long been told. 
Yet, during what was called "The Year of the Child," children who 
walked in silence in defense of other children's lives were subject to 
public ridicule. One might well suppose that the most eloquent tribute 
to life is life itself. Arguments in defense of life, no matter how cogent 
or compelling, are still arguments - thin abstractions infinitely 
removed from life in the flesh. If we cannot defend life with life, what 
more moving testimony can we possibly provide? The child is not so 
much an adroit conversationalist as a presence who both expresses 
and affirms life by the natural act of being alive. 
Nonetheless, a child did speak out. In another letter to the editor, a 
10-year-old Waterloo youth stated: "It angers me that you would 
think a 10-year-old is not intelligent enough to understand abor-
tion .... I think of abortion as murder .... " But the more telling 
letter, appearing in the same edition, belonged to a Kitchener mother 
who wrote: "The child mentioned in the letter was our son .... While 
he may not know the different methods used in aborting, he does 
know that abortion is terminating the pregnancy and killing the child 
that might have been. What he can't understand is why someone 
would want to do something like that. Why, he asks, wouldn't some-
one else take the baby and love it? Why does our son know about 
abortion? I'm sure our son and many other sons and daughters know 
about abortion because their parents are askable and answerable 
parents. When I was questioned about the walk ... that was my 
opportunity to be answerable. I discussed abortion with him. My 
explanation led to his reply: 'I'm glad you wanted all of us and didn't 
kill us and I'm happy to be in this family.' " 
. We find ourselves in an embarrassing moral contradiction. We give 
our children life and then disparage them when they hold it dear. It is 
safe to acknowledge that time and experience do not guarantee the 
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attainment of moral consistency, let alone moral wisdom. The value of 
life is something that has to be explained to adults, not to children, 
whereas the advantages of killing must be explained to children, and 
not to adults. Whether or not a child knows about abortion, he does 
know what life "is and means" and what killing "is and means." 
The image of the unapproving child who cannot comprehend why 
people have abortions should stop us short and oblige us to rethink 
and re-evaluate our moral stance. Consider how the child 's presence in 
the walk impressed itself so forcefully on the minds of the journalist 
and his complaining reader that they seemed almost oblivious to the 
thousand adults who dominated the procession. How do we under-
stand this peculiarity? The adult is nature's appointed guardian of the 
child. When a child appeals to the adult to protect the lives of unborn 
children, he reminds the adult of his obligations to assume this natural 
role. But in the case where the adult wants no part of such a role, any 
reminder, especially from a child, is too ego·threatening for him to 
take seriously. Thus, he reacts against the child, dismissing him as 
insubordinate, unintelligent, or irrelevant, in an attempt to deny that 
he is delinquent as an adult and accountable to a child. But the truth 
remains - stark and unendurable. 
The very presence of a child makes life plain and palpable. The 
adult, however, often so estranged from life, commonly applies arti-
ficial forms of stimulation to be reassured that it still throbs in him. 
The child's protest against abortion, therefore, is most disturbing 
because his bond with life makes him relatively immune to adult 
rationalizations. The child cannot readily be talked out of his 
allegiance to life and the adult fears that all he learned in growing up 
was how to be more indifferent to life and less indifferent to death. 
Linda Bird Francke, who in her words, "touched a national nerve" 
when she described her own abortion in the New York Times, 
defended her decision in a subsequent book she called The 
Ambivalence of Abortion. She had written about her abortion under 
the pseudonym "Jane Doe" in order not to reveal her deed to 
members of her family , particularly her children whom she regarded as 
too young to understand what an abortion is. 
In her book, published two years after her abortion, she relates her 
attempt to discuss the subject with her 12-year-old son, Andrew. 
"Suppose I had an abortion?" she hypothesized. "You're married, and 
there is no reason for you not to have another baby," he replied. 
"How could you kill something - no matter how little it is - that's 
going to grow and have legs and wiggle its fingers? I would be furious 
with you if you had an abortion. I'd lose all respect for you for being 
so selfish." 
Mrs. Francke decided to wait until Andrew was older before they 
discussed the subject again. For the moment, as she said, her son was 
"deeply moralistic, as many children are at that age." 
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The prejudice against the unborn must pass to the prejudice against 
children. For it is unlikely that children will countenance abortion. 
Children, especially the very young, who draw their daily breath in an 
atmosphere of family love and who are sheltered from the unmet 
menaces of the outside world, have an uncompromising attachment to 
life. Theirs is a world, much like the Eden of their ancestral parents, 
where death is yet unknown. The decision to kill, then, does not 
correspond to anything with which they are familiar, any impulse they 
have felt, any idea they could endorse. In order to justify abortion 
fully, we must either discredit children or change them. If adult 
attitudes are to remain sovereign in the moral universe, children must 
have no voice. Swiss psychologist, Carl Jung, however, offers an 
admonition which, in the context of contemporary abortion ethics, 
might appear as one of searing impertinence : "If there is anything that 
we wish to change in the child, we should first examine it and see 
whether it is not something that could better be changed in us." 
The adults's assessment of the child is either realistic or imperial-
istic. It is realistic when he sees the positive as well as the negative 
characteristics of the child, that is, when he sees the child as he is con-
stituted by nature. If he sees the child as simply not being an adult, 
then he sees the child solely in terms of deficiencies, and his attitude 
tends to be imperialistic. This habit of viewing children as deficient 
adults or as mere fractions of adults is well established among 
grown-ups. The commonness of the expression "When are you going 
to grow up?" attests to the commonness of a single standard for 
human conduct - the adult standard. Hence, the child is understood 
negatively from the viewpoint of what he is not, what he cannot do, 
and what he does not have; and is judged impulsively as inexperienced, 
immature, ignorant, and unaccomplished, thereby placing him in a 
most unfair predicament in which his only hope is to hurry up and 
become an adult. Thus, all the while he is misjudged, misunderstood 
and criticized for his bad manners, clumsiness, forgetfulness, general 
unappreciativeness, and lack of awareness of the worth of a dollar, his 
real and unique value as a child is at peril. 
The renowned fetologist, Sir William Liley, has remarked that 
because the medicine of adults preceded the medicine of the infant, 
neonate, and fetus, the tendency has developed in various fields from 
surgery to psychiatry, to start with the adult and work backward. 
"The net effect," according to Dr. Liley, "has been to consider the 
fetus and neonate as a poorly functioning adult rather than as a 
splendidly functioning baby." The baby's asymmetric kidney function, 
for example, should not be seen as "immature" or "inferior" to adult 
kidney functioning, but as something entirely appropriate to his 
particular circumstances. 
The imperialistic view of the child is unenlightened because it fails 
to see the child as he is. Moreover, it rests on a false analogy which 
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depicts the broad age spectrum of human life as a mountain where the 
adult stands at the summit, fulfilled and complete, while everyone 
else's position is evaluated negatively by its distance from that point. 
Each stage of life, however, has a value and dignity of its own and 
should not be evaluated solely in terms of a single age category. And it 
is sobering to recall that this same adult standard unjustly 'identifies 
the elderly as "adults in decline," as "people past their prime," as "has 
beens." 
Psychiatrists point out that it is extremely rare for children to 
suffer that peculiar estrangement from life called "schizophrenia," 
before puberty. The young child, generally speaking, is integrated and 
realistic. He is not prone, as adults are, to becoming a prisoner of his 
own desires. And this at least partially explains why, as philosopher 
Karl Jaspers states, "It is not uncommon to hear from the mouths of 
children words which penetrate to the. very depths of philosophy." 
What values, then, does the child embody? We think of innocence 
and simplicity. But children are not innocent for very long, and they 
can be quite crafty when they desire something very strongly. We also 
think of cuteness and childish charm. But these, too, fail to pass the 
test. They are momentary; the child can just as easily be unpleasant 
and disagreeable. 
Positive characteristics are often born of inherent deficiencies. The 
congenitally blind often develop an acute sensitivity to sound; the 
disabled learn patience; the poor, how to dream. One is strong as a 
Christian because he acknowledges his infirmity as a man. This is also 
true of the child. By nature he is dependent; therefore, he must trust. 
Because he does not have a developed ego, he must be open to things 
outside himself. The child's spontaneous acts of trust and openness 
constitute the essence of childlikeness, and are the very qualities that 
give him faith - not necessarily religious faith, but faith in life, in 
love, in parents, and in the adult world. And when these qualities are 
affirmed in the child, they are more likely to be preserved in the adult. 
The child, of course, has no innate sympathy for popular conven-
tion. Closely allied with his childlikeness is a candor which, on the 
right occasion, can be as welcome as a gossip columnist at a wedding. 
The story of "The Emperor's New Clothes" draws attention to the 
child's role as anti-social "brat." The adults, having vested interests, 
agreed the emperor was beautifully appointed; only the child was 
willing to proclaim the naked truth. 
Theologian Romano Guardini states that what is most precious in 
the child is his "clarity of vision: the ability to look up and out, to 
feel and accept reality without ulterior motives." We might say that 
the child instinctively sees the world in nature's terms; the adult, quite 
often, through the artificial lens of custom, convention, and socio-
economics. Thus, the child, in accepting the natural order of things, 
especially the order of protecting life that obtains between parent and 
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child, cannot believe that the destruction of pre-natal human life is 
necessary. Abortion is incomprehensible to him - as are war, tyranny, 
and lust - and it frightens him. 
Several years ago a group of doctors reported in the journal of 
Psychosomatic Medicine the reactions of 87 children whose mothers 
had abortions. These reactions were categorized as of an immediate 
type, characterized by anxiety attacks, nightmares, stuttering, running 
away, death phobias, increased separation anxiety, sudden outbursts 
of fear or hatred against the mother, and even suicide attempts; and a 
late type including a range of effects from isolated fantasies to crucial 
disabling illnesses. 
Childlikeness belongs to the child because it is natural to him. But 
as the child grows, he may lose this quality and enter into an adult 
world in which he measures the value of things in more arbitrary 
terms. At this time he sees things less in their own right and more in 
terms of the expressed wishes of society. In this perspective, he 
becomes more sensitive to sins against custom than against nature. 
Things must now "prove" themselves to him in order to be validated 
and accepted. The unwanted child has failed to prove himself to his 
parents and may be considered a poor investment, whereas an active 
stock may have proved itself very well. 
But it is precisely the nature of the unborn and the newly born not 
to be able to prove themselves. How, then, can they be accepted by 
the adult world? Only, it would seem, if the adults have preserved in 
themselves a sufficient measure of childlikeness to enable them to 
accept those who are incapable of proving themselves. In a certain 
sense, Antoine de Saint Exupery's remark in The Little Prince is not 
an exaggeration: "Grown-ups never understand anything by them-
selves, and it is tiresome for children to be always and forever explain-
ing things to them." The child must re-explain through his presence 
the order of creation to the adult who has nearly forgotten it. 
"Genius," wrote Baudelaire, "is the rediscovery of childhood." 
Andre Maurois added, "To become a poet is to remain a child." For 
William Wordsworth, "Heaven lies about us in our infancy!" 
We do not, of course, want to romanticize or sentimentalize either 
children or childhood. The refusal to grow out of childhood is childish 
and is an expression of fear of responsibility. Michael Novak com-
plains that he knows "50-year-olds who are still kids. They're in the 
playground of the world: single, unattached, self-fulfilling, self-
centered ... trying to make little Disney Worlds of detachment for 
themselves. " 
Still, the importance of children cannot be over-estimated. A world 
without children soon becomes jaded and devoid of spirit. The 
Playboy empire is such a world and in order for its own peculiar 
cultishness to be preserved, it must promote violence against the 
unborn. Play boy's obsessive interest in sexual pleasure necessitates 
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that sex not be interrupted by the burden of children. Consequently, 
it was logical for the Playboy Foundation to subsidize the Doe u. 
Wade case that led to the United State's Supreme Court's landmark 
abortion decision in 1973. 
Disneyland, on the other hand, is a world without adults, or at least 
without legitimate adult attitudes. Inevitably, its childlike element 
must be marred by its context, which is essentially childish. Although 
they are temporary havens from adult priorities, rules, and regulations, 
the Disney environments are lacking in paternity. Mickey Mouse and 
Donald Duck are not parents, nor are they married, or even gainfully 
employed. It would be too incongruous for these animals to appear as 
anything more than children's playmates. The illusion of perpetual 
childhood would be lost with the arrival of fully sexualized, respon-
sible adults. 
The child and the adult are morally interdependent. The 
unaffirmed child means a poorly developed adult who will add more 
confusion to an already confused world. We begin to heal the world 
by affirming the child so as to develop responsible adults whose vision 
extends beyond self-interest to include the world. 
We now return to our initial question: "How does one evaluate a 
silent walk around an abortion-performing hospital?" If we cannot see 
the value of the unborn lives, we most likely cannot see the value of a 
walk in their behalf. But the presence of the child does not reduce this 
demonstration to a travesty. In fact, it suggests the very way in which 
the walk must be understood. The child reminds us of our need for 
trust and openness - the virtue of childlikeness - and the unnatural-
ness of violent resolutions to human problems. At the same time, he 
reminds us that there is always more to life than what we can see, and 
that vision built on faith is an indispensable antidote to narrowing 
adult preoccupations with security and self-interest. And whether this 
faith is in life or in the Author of life, it is nonetheless a vital force 
and a principal source of illumination. 
The way of the contemporary world is assuredly not the way of 
faith but one of power and technique. The child and the modern 
world stand in perfect opposition to each other. But it would be fool-
hardy to try to resolve the world's problems solely in the world's 
terms: fighting power with more power, technique with more 
advanced technique, financial resources with greater financial 
resources. The Space Age and Atomic Age are also the Age of 
Anxiety. The great power modern man has at his disposal frightens 
him and can offer no real hope for his beleaguered spirit. His hope, 
then, must include forces which are exactly the opposite of the 
world's. Thus, the modern age which aspires to be the Age of Peace 
must also be the Age of the Child. 
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